+ "details": "### Summary\n\ndottie versions 2.0.4 through 2.0.6 contain an incomplete fix for CVE-2023-26132. The prototype pollution guard introduced in commit `7d3aee1` only validates the first segment of a dot-separated path, allowing an attacker to bypass the protection by placing `__proto__` at any position other than the first.\n\nBoth `dottie.set()` and `dottie.transform()` are affected.\n\n### Details\n\nThe existing guard checks only `pieces[0] === '__proto__'`. When a path like `'a.__proto__.polluted'` is used, `pieces[0]` evaluates to `'a'`, not `'__proto__'`, so the guard is bypassed.\n\nInside the traversal loop, `current['__proto__'] = {}` triggers the `__proto__` setter, replacing the intermediate object's prototype. The final value is then written onto this new prototype.\n\n**Important distinction:** This vulnerability does NOT pollute the global `Object.prototype`. It injects properties into a specific object's prototype chain. However, injected properties are invisible to `hasOwnProperty()` and `Object.keys()`, which makes them difficult to detect and can lead to authorization bypass in common coding patterns.\n\n### PoC\n```javascript\nconst dottie = require('dottie');\n\n// set() bypass\nconst obj = {};\ndottie.set(obj, 'session.__proto__.isAdmin', true);\nconsole.log(obj.session.isAdmin); // true\nconsole.log(({}).isAdmin); // undefined\nconsole.log(obj.session.hasOwnProperty('isAdmin')); // false\n\n// transform() bypass\nconst flat = { 'user.__proto__.role': 'admin', 'user.name': 'guest' };\nconst result = dottie.transform(flat);\nconsole.log(result.user.role); // 'admin'\nconsole.log(({}).role); // undefined\n```\n\nTested on Node.js v20 and v22, dottie 2.0.6, Windows 11.\n\n### Impact\n\nThe primary risk is authorization bypass. In a typical server-side scenario where dottie is used to process user input (e.g., via Sequelize, which depends on dottie with ~1.3M weekly npm downloads), an attacker can inject properties like `isAdmin: true` into objects used for access control decisions. Since the injected property is not an own property, standard checks using `hasOwnProperty()` or `Object.keys()` will not reveal it, while property access like `if (session.isAdmin)` will return `true`.\n\nAdditionally, replacing an object's prototype via `current['__proto__'] = {}` strips all inherited methods, potentially causing TypeError exceptions and denial of service.",
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