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Merged
eddalmond1 merged 9 commits into from
Aug 15, 2025
Merged

eli-385 finessing github permissions #283

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73324b6
eli-385 finessing github permissions
eddalmond1 Aug 7, 2025
a7cb932
eli-385 updating permissions boundary to only include exact permissio…
eddalmond1 Aug 7, 2025
99f5572
eli-385 changing assumed role permissions boundary
eddalmond1 Aug 7, 2025
38e2133
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into feature/eja-eli-385-r…
eddalmond1 Aug 12, 2025
e03ad5d
Merge branch 'main' into feature/eja-eli-385-remove-wildcard-resource…
eddalmond1 Aug 12, 2025
6279ee2
Merge branch 'main' into feature/eja-eli-385-remove-wildcard-resource…
eddalmond1 Aug 12, 2025
9626a17
Merge branch 'main' into feature/eja-eli-385-remove-wildcard-resource…
eddalmond1 Aug 13, 2025
b2d9a0b
eli-385 restricting kms key decryption to only those keys created in …
eddalmond1 Aug 13, 2025
7c1c332
Merge branch 'main' into feature/eja-eli-385-remove-wildcard-resource…
Karthikeyannhs Aug 15, 2025
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76 changes: 47 additions & 29 deletions infrastructure/stacks/api-layer/assumed_role_permissions_boundary.tf
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -6,35 +6,53 @@ data "aws_iam_policy_document" "assumed_role_permissions_boundary" {
effect = "Allow"

actions = [
"acm:*",
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@eddalmond1 eddalmond1 Aug 12, 2025

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This is the permissions boundary used by assumed roles (e.g. lambda, cloudwatch --> kinesis etc.) so the permissions boundary itself needs to restrict to only those actions and resources we'd expect those roles to use.

"application-autoscaling:*",
"apigateway:*",
"cloudtrail:*",
"cloudwatch:*",
"config:*",
"dynamodb:*",
"ec2:*",
"events:*",
"firehose:*",
"glue:*",
"health:*",
"iam:*",
"kms:*",
"lambda:*",
"logs:*",
"network-firewall:*",
"pipes:*",
"s3:*",
"schemas:*",
"sns:*",
"servicequotas:*",
"ssm:*",
"states:*",
"support:*",
"sqs:*",
"tag:*",
"trustedadvisor:*",
"xray:*"
# DynamoDB - table operations for Lambda and external write roles
"dynamodb:GetItem",
"dynamodb:Query",
"dynamodb:Scan",
"dynamodb:PutItem",
"dynamodb:UpdateItem",
"dynamodb:DeleteItem",
"dynamodb:BatchWriteItem",

# S3 - bucket and object operations for Lambda and Firehose
"s3:GetObject",
"s3:ListBucket",
"s3:PutObject",
"s3:PutObjectAcl",
"s3:AbortMultipartUpload",
"s3:GetBucketLocation",
"s3:ListBucketMultipartUploads",

# KMS - encryption/decryption for DynamoDB and S3
"kms:Encrypt",
"kms:Decrypt",
"kms:ReEncrypt*",
"kms:GenerateDataKey",
"kms:GenerateDataKey*",
"kms:DescribeKey",

# CloudWatch Logs - Lambda execution and Firehose logging
"logs:CreateLogGroup",
"logs:CreateLogStream",
"logs:PutLogEvents",
"logs:DescribeLogGroups",
"logs:DescribeLogStreams",

# EC2 - VPC access for Lambda (from AWSLambdaVPCAccessExecutionRole)
"ec2:CreateNetworkInterface",
"ec2:DescribeNetworkInterfaces",
"ec2:DeleteNetworkInterface",
"ec2:AttachNetworkInterface",
"ec2:DetachNetworkInterface",

# Kinesis Firehose - Lambda writing audit data
"firehose:PutRecord",
"firehose:PutRecordBatch",

# X-Ray - Lambda tracing
"xray:PutTraceSegments",
"xray:PutTelemetryRecords"
]

resources = ["*"]
Expand Down
77 changes: 60 additions & 17 deletions infrastructure/stacks/iams-developer-roles/github_actions_policies.tf
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Expand Up @@ -163,6 +163,8 @@ resource "aws_iam_policy" "s3_management" {
"arn:aws:s3:::*eligibility-signposting-api-${var.environment}-truststore/*",
"arn:aws:s3:::*eligibility-signposting-api-${var.environment}-truststore-access-logs",
"arn:aws:s3:::*eligibility-signposting-api-${var.environment}-truststore-access-logs/*",
"arn:aws:s3:::*eligibility-signposting-api-${var.environment}-eli-splunk-backup",
"arn:aws:s3:::*eligibility-signposting-api-${var.environment}-eli-splunk-backup/*"
]
}
]
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -196,20 +198,62 @@ resource "aws_iam_policy" "api_infrastructure" {
# ACM for certs
"acm:DescribeCertificate",
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@eddalmond1 eddalmond1 Aug 12, 2025

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acm needs * level resource as it's an 'account level' thing.

"acm:GetCertificate",
"acm:ListCertificates",
# S3 for mTLS truststore
"s3:GetObject",
# CloudWatch Logs for logging
"logs:CreateLogGroup",
"logs:CreateLogStream",
"logs:PutLogEvents",
# IAM PassRole for logging role association (if needed)
"iam:PassRole"
"acm:ListCertificates"

],
Resource = "*"
#checkov:skip=CKV_AWS_289: Actions require wildcard resource
},
{
Effect = "Allow",
Action = [
# CloudWatch Logs creation and management
"logs:CreateLogGroup",
"logs:CreateLogStream",
"logs:PutLogEvents"
],
Resource = [
# VPC Flow Logs
"arn:aws:logs:${var.default_aws_region}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:log-group:/aws/vpc/*",
# Lambda function logs
"arn:aws:logs:${var.default_aws_region}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:log-group:/aws/lambda/*",
# API Gateway logs
"arn:aws:logs:${var.default_aws_region}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:log-group:/aws/apigateway/*",
# Kinesis Firehose logs
"arn:aws:logs:${var.default_aws_region}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:log-group:/aws/kinesisfirehose/*"
]
},
{
Effect = "Allow",
Action = [
# IAM PassRole for specific service roles only
"iam:PassRole"
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@eddalmond1 eddalmond1 Aug 13, 2025

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This specifically addresses the issue around passrole, limiting it to just the roles we want to deploy (and allow AWS services to assume)

],
Resource = [
# Lambda execution roles
"arn:aws:iam::${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:role/eligibility_lambda-role*",
# API Gateway CloudWatch logging role
"arn:aws:iam::${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:role/*-api-gateway-*-role",
# VPC Flow Logs role
"arn:aws:iam::${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:role/vpc-flow-logs-role*",
# EventBridge to Firehose role
"arn:aws:iam::${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:role/eventbridge-firehose-role*",
# Kinesis Firehose S3 backup roles
"arn:aws:iam::${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:role/*firehose*role*",
"arn:aws:iam::${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:role/splunk-firehose-assume-role*"
],
Condition = {
StringEquals = {
"iam:PassedToService" = [
"lambda.amazonaws.com",
"apigateway.amazonaws.com",
"vpc-flow-logs.amazonaws.com",
"events.amazonaws.com",
"firehose.amazonaws.com"
]
}
}
},
{
Effect = "Allow",
Action = [
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -299,24 +343,22 @@ resource "aws_iam_policy" "kms_creation" {
{
Effect = "Allow",
Action = [
# Key creation and listing actions require wildcard resource
"kms:CreateKey",
"kms:DescribeKey",
"kms:CreateAlias",
"kms:List*",
"kms:ListAliases",
"kms:Decrypt",
"kms:Encrypt",
"kms:ReEncrypt*",
"kms:ListAliases"
],
Resource = "*"
},
{
Effect = "Allow",
Action = [
# Key management actions on account-specific keys only
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@eddalmond1 eddalmond1 Aug 13, 2025

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IAM customer managed policies should not allow decryption actions on all KMS keys

Restricting here to only those created in the account. Deployment role needs to be able to do this to access assets...

"kms:DescribeKey",
"kms:Describe*",
"kms:GetKeyPolicy*",
"kms:GetKeyRotationStatus",
"kms:Decrypt*",
"kms:DeleteAlias",
"kms:UpdateKeyDescription",
"kms:CreateGrant",
Expand All @@ -325,8 +367,9 @@ resource "aws_iam_policy" "kms_creation" {
"kms:ScheduleKeyDeletion",
"kms:PutKeyPolicy",
"kms:Encrypt",
"kms:TagResource",
"kms:GenerateDataKey",
"kms:Decrypt",
"kms:ReEncrypt*",
"kms:GenerateDataKey"
],
Resource = [
"arn:aws:kms:${var.default_aws_region}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:key/*",
Expand Down
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